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THE ADMINISTRATION OF TITLE II OF THE
FIRST WAR POWERS ACT
By C. S. MCCLELLAND *
"Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of
some ruler, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat. Where discretion is absolute, man has
always suffered.... . "1
T HE legal significance of a Government contract may be far different than
appears from a reading of the four corners of the instrument. It is not
certain that it actually means, what it expressly states, that the Government
will receive all of the goods to which it is entitled from the public funds paid
to the contractor. As of December 31, 1954, on military contracts (not in-
cluding public works construction) totalling $28,496,093,071, a total sum of
$4,438,077,342 had been paid without any delivered items to cover that
amount.2  As of December 31, 1955, no items had been received to cover
payments totalling $4,040,095,059 under contracts involving a total sum of
$25,166,420,363. It is not certain that the Government will actually receive
all of the goods, to which it is entitled, until it agrees to pay a substantial
sum in addition to what the contractor is entitled to be paid. In a period of
a single year, amendments to contracts, increasing the contract price, were
made in a total sum of $8,210,336.45 without any consideration issuing to
the Government.' If the contractor is late in making deliveries, the Govern-
ment may waive the liquidated damages to which it is entitled under the con-
tract even though the contractor included in its bid price a portion of those
damages and the contractor receives a complete windfall to that extent.' In
fact, it is not at all certain that the contractor did not obtain the contract in
the first instance by means of an agent paid under a no-contract-no-fee ar-
rangement and that the contractor will ever be held accountable under the
contract covenant against contingent fees, even though the amount of the fee
is included once if not twice in the contract price of the goods.' Much of
this strange state of affairs in the Government's contracting relationships is
* Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia and of the Supreme Court of the United States;
A.B., M.A., LL.B., The George Washington University; author, The Covenant Against Contingent
Fees as a Method of Eliminating the "5-Percenter", 41 CORNELL L. Q. (Spring, 1956).
1 United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951).
2 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, on Par-
ticipation of Small Business in Military Procurement, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1955).
a Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, on Small
Business Policies and Programs of Government Agencies as related to Government Procurement-
1956, 84th Cong., 2d Sees. 366 (1956).
4S. REP. 1498, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1952).
5 Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contracts Disputes Settlement, 67 HARV. L. R. 217,
223 n. 24 (1953).
6H. R. REP. No. 2356, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1942).
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due to a most unprecedented piece of legislation-to which one Congressman
has referred as practically upsetting the law of contracts 7-first passed during
the emergency period in December, 1941, and revived again in another de-
clared emergency in December, 1950, under the name of the First War Powers
Act, 8 as implemented by Executive Orders Nos. 9001 and 10210.
7Hearings before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, on H. R. 5944
and S. 2421 to Amend the Act of January 12, 1951 (64 STAT. 1257) Amending and Extending Title
II of the First War Powers Act, 1941, Serial No. 18, 82d Cong., 2d Sess, 10-11 (1952).
8 55 STAT. 839 (1941); 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
96 FED. REG. 6787 (1941); 16 FED. REG. 1049 (1951). Executive Order No. 10210, dated
February 2, 1951, is as follows:
"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the First War Powers Act, 1941, as amended by
the act of January 12, 1951, entitled 'An Act To amend and extend title II of the First War Powers
Act, 1941' (Public Law 921, 81st Congress), hereinafter called the Act, and as President of the
United States and Commander in Chief of the armed forces of the United States, and deeming that
such action will facilitate the national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Part I
"Under such regulations, which shall be uniform to the extent practicable, as may be prescribed
or approved by the Secretary of Defense:
"1. The Department of Defense is authorized, within the limits of the amounts appropriated
and the contract authorization provided therefor, to enter into contracts and into amendments or
modifications of contracts heretofore or hereafter made, and to make advance, progress, and other
payments thereon, without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, performance,
amendment, or modification of contracts.
"2. The Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force may exercise the author-
ity herein conferred and, in their discretion and by their direction may delegate such authority to
any other military or civilian officer or officials of their respective departments, and may confer upon
any such military or civilian officers or officials the power to make further delegations of such au-
thority within their respective departments.
"3. The contracts hereby authorized to be made include agreements of all kinds (whether in
the form of letters of intent, purchase orders, or otherwise) for all types and kinds of things and
services necessary, appropriate or convenient for the national defense, or for the invention, develop-
ment, or production of, or research concerning any such things, including, but not limited to, air-
craft, buildings, vessels, arms, armament, equipment, or supplies of any kind, or any portion thereof,
including plans, spare parts and equipment therefor, materials, supplies, facilities, utilities, machin-
ery, machine tools, and any other equipment without any restriction of any kind, either as to type,
character, location, or form.
"4. The Department of Defense may by agreement modify or amend or settle claims under
contracts heretofore or hereafter made, may make advance, progress, and other payments upon such
contracts of any percentum of the contract price, and may enter into agreements with contractors or
obligors, modifying or releasing accrued obligations of any sort, including accrued liquidated dam-
ages or liability under surety or other bonds, whenever, in the judgment of the Secretaries of De-
fense, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force, respectively, or their duly authorized representatives,
the national defense will be thereby facilitated. Amendments and modifications of contracts may be
with or without consideration and may be utilized to accomplish the same things as any original
contract could have accomplished hereunder, irrespective of the time or circumstances of the making,
or the form, of the contract amended or modified, or of the amending or modifying contract, and
irrespective of rights which may have accrued under the contract or the amendments or modifications
thereof.
"5. Advertising, competitive bidding, and bid, payment, performance or other bonds or other
forms of security need not be required.
"6. Complete data shall be maintained by the Department of Defense as to all contracts and
purchases made pursuant to the Act and this order. The Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy,
and the Air Force shall make available for public inspection so much of such data as they may
respectively deem compatible with the public interest and as does not cover classified contracts or
purchases.
"7. There shall be no discrimination in any act performed hereunder against any person on the
ground of race, creed, color or national origin, and all contracts hereunder shall contain a provision
that the contractor and any subcontractors thereunder shall not so discriminate.
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The subject of this article suggested itself because of the writer's con-
viction that too many in the three branches of the Government are not aware
of the weaknesses in the administration of title 11 of the First War Powers
Act and in the executive implementation of it. The breadth of those weak-
nesses appears to be such as to include some within the comprehension of the
layman as well as the lawyer. Their nature appears so serious as to raise con-
siderable doubt that the administrative agencies of the Government have had
any authority to perform under the Act since June 30, 1953.
The lack of clear, definable standards in the administration of certain
powers under the Act is in conflict with man's traditional affinity for a gov-
ernment by law and with the lawyer's understanding of well established rules
"8. No claim against the United States arising under any purchase or contract made under the
authority of the Act and this order shall be assigned except in accordance with the Assignment of
Claims Act of 1940 (54 STAT. 1029).
'9. Advance payments shall be made hereunder only after careful scrutiny to determine that such
payments will promote the national defense.
"10. Every contract entered into, amended, or modified pursuant to this order shall contain a
warranty by the contractor in substantially the following terms:
The Contractor warrants that no person or selling agency has been employed or retained
to solicit or secure this contract upon an agreement or understanding for a commission, per-
centage, brokerage, or contingent fee, excepting bona fide employees or bona fide established
commercial or selling agencies maintained by the Contractor for the purpose of securing business.
For breach or violation of this warranty the Government shall have the right to annul this con-
tract without liability or in its discretion to deduct from the contract price or consideration the
full amount of such commission, percentage, brokerage, or contingent fee.
"11. All contracts entered into, amended, or modified pursuant to authority of this order shall
include a clause to the effect that the Comptroller General of the United States or any of his duly
authorized representatives shall have access to and the right to examine any pertinent books, docu-
ments, papers, and records of the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance
of and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts.
"12. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system
of contracting.
" 13. Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize any contracts in violation of existing
law relating to limitation of profits, or the payment of a fee in excess of such limitation as may
be specifically set forth in the act appropriating the funds or granting the contract authorization
obligated by a contract. In the absence of such limitation, the fixed fee to be paid the contractor
as a result of any cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract entered into under the authority of this order shall
not exceed 10 percentum of the estimated cost of the contract, exclusive of the fee, as determined by
the Secretary of Defense, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force at the time of entering into such
contract (except that a fee not in excess of 15 percentum of such estimated cost is authorized in any
such contract for experimental, developmental, or research work, and that a fee inclusive of the con-
tractor's costs and not in excess of 6 percentum of the estimated cost, exclusive of fees, as determined
by the Secretary of Defense, the Army, the Navy, or the Air Force at the time of entering into the
contract, of the project to which such fee is applicable, is authorized in contracts for architectural
or engineering services relating to any public works or utility project).
"14. No contract or modification or amendment thereof shall be exempt from the provisions of
the Walsh-Healey Act (49 (STAT. 2036), as amended, because of being entered into without adver-
tising or competitive bidding, and the provisions of such act, the Davis-Bacon Act (49 STAT. 1011),
as amended, the Copeland Act (48 STAT. 948), as amended, and the Eight Hour Law (37 STAT. 137),
as amended, if otherwise applicable shall apply to contracts made and performed under the authority
of this order.
"15. Nothing herein contained shall prejudice anything heretofore done under Executive Order
No. 9001 of December 27, 1941, or any amendments or extensions thereof, or the continuance in
force of an action heretofore taken under the said order or any amendments or extensions thereof.
"16. Nothing herein contained shall prejudice any authority to utilize the provisions of the
Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 (62 STAT. 26) and regulations thereunder."
1957.]
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of administrative and constitutional law. An administrator who states that
while he pays lip service to published standards of operation, he actually
applies the law according to good business judgment, everything considered,"
unwittingly discloses indulgence in the precise type of discretionary action
which destroys the orderly processes of government by law. Such adminis-
tration of an act, which expressly requires standards (regulations), is not a
compliance with the terms of the act and defeats the very purpose of the rule
of administrative and constitutional law which requires standards in legis-
lation itself or a clear, valid provision delegating the establishment of stand-
ards." Additionally, the provisions of an act, requiring an executive deter-
mination, are not fulfilled by a blanket executive determination accompanied
by executive directions to administrative agencies to make the same deter-
mination in each instance certain powers under the act are exercised.2 The
article points out the lack of any significant report on the administration of
the Act in question and then proceeds to a statement of the Act itself and
an analysis of the responsibility the Act places upon the President. It uses
two approaches in raising a question as to the authority of the agencies to
perform under the Act. The first approach relates to the administrative-
constitutional question as to the validity of the continued use of an execu-
tive order issued by a prior President whose authority and therefore, whose
order, was limited by the life of the Act due to expire in less than six months
after the incumbent President took office. The second approach deals with
an analysis of the executive order, to show why it does not seem reasonable
to assume that there was any conscious adoption of it by the present incum-
bent. Weaknesses are shown to exist in the administration of all of the more
important powers in title 11,-amendments without consideration, negotiated
procurement and progress payments.
While it has been indicated that the success in granting the powers under
the Act absolutely depends upon the integrity of the administration," compe-
10 Hearings, supra note 7, at 61.
11 Standards here are used in the sense of regulations since the legislative history uses the word
in that sense. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-4 (1892); OPP Cotton Mills, Inc. et al. v. Admin-
istrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 144-145 (1941).
i2 Executive Order No. 10210, preamble and paragraphs 4 and 9, 16 Fed. Reg. 1049 (1951). In
this connection, see Sparkman, The Administration of Title II, First llar Powers Act, 1941, 14 U.
PITT. L. REv. 303, 317-318 (1953): "The interpretation and administration of federal statutes by
agencies of the executive branch of the Government leaves a broad area for misinterpretation of the
will of Congress and maladministration of its laws. By the terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act, and by virtue of regulations relating to the operation of administrative tribunals litigants must
exhaust their remedies within the administrative processes before appeals will lie to the courts. This
means that oftentimes errors of interpretation will not come to light until much mischief has been
done. . . . There should be a definitive procedure whereby the Congress or its committees should
be enabled speedily to redirect agencies of the executive branch where they are found to he misguided
in their conception of a federal statute." (Emphasis added.)
11 Hearings before the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments (now the
Committee on Government Operations), on S. 4266 to Amend and Extend Title II of the First War
Powers Act, 1941, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1951).
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tence would seem equally important. Weakness in integrity might lead to
excessive rationalization in granting amendments without consideration or
progress payments but incompetence involving illogical, unsound reasoning
could produce unwarranted relief under the act despite the very best of in-
tentions that might exist in integrity of the highest degree. Comments of
public record, such as one Senator's observation that the agencies certainly
spent an unlimited amount of money under the Act during World War II
and "not . . .particularly well done", 4 appear to be based upon considera-
tions of competency as well as of integrity. With no evidence of record that
the administration of all of the important powers under the Act was any better
"done," in the period of its use since World War II, and with much evidence
that it was not well done, as will be shown later in this article, Congress has
proceeded annually to extend the Act for another year and most recently pro-
ceeded to extend it for a period of two years from June 30, 1955," longer
than at any time since World War II.
The article shows that irrespective of the validity of the powers exer-
cised by the agencies pursuant to Executive Order 10210, since June 30, 1953,
the administration of those powers has been very weak in several respects;
that the legislature, as well as the executive branch of the Government, is
at fault for not producing at least annual comprehensive reports, by the Presi-
dent and by the agencies, on the administration of the numerous powers
granted by the Act; and that there are a number of indications that the Act
and its administration have never received the Presidential attention clearly
required by it.
LACK OF PREVIOUS REPORTS ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE ACT
It seems to have become almost a commonplace to expect that each year
Congress will extend the duration of the War Powers Act as "unduly auto-
matically" as a Defense Department official has described that Department's
policy, at one time at least, in granting progress payments 1 in its exercise
of one of the powers under the Act. Since at the time of the latest extension
of the Act, Congress was prevailed upon to grant it for two years instead of
the usual one year,' 7 it would not be surprising to find that very soon an
attempt will be made to obtain another extension to continue the Act in force
beyond June 30, 1957, the present expiration date, unless Congress or the
President terminates the emergency declaration made on December 20, 1950.18
14 Id. at 35.
1, 6 9 STAT. 82 (1955), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).16 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Select Committee on Small Business, on Partici-
pation of Small Business in Military Procurement, 83d Cong., 2d Se1s. 340-341 (1954).
1" See note 15 supra.
I8 15 FED. REG. 9029 (1950); 1 CCH GOV'T. CONTRACTS REP. 17501 (1952).
1957.]
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Notwithstanding the fact that Title II of the First War Powers Act has
been considered by Congress every year for several years when it was neces-
sary to consider the wisdom of extending its duration, little evidence has been
found that in any of the deliberations of Congress and its committees on the
matter was there any consideration or presentation of the facts on the admin-
istration of many of the important and unprecedented powers granted by
the Act. What little attention has been given to the administration of the
Act has for the most part been devoted to the power to amend contracts with-
out consideration, and attempts to secure an extremely liberal exercise of that
power, in substantially complete disregard of the serious weaknesses in the
administration of that power and certain of the other powers under the Act.
Desire to retain the authority to amend contracts without consideration
has not been the only reason the agencies annually have had to seek an ex-
tension of Title II of the First War Powers Act. That fact is obvious from
the extensive use of negotiated procurement and progress payments, but no
one appears to have coordinated the very substantial evidence of weaknesses
in the administration of those two procurement practices, with the annual
consideration of title II of the First War Powers Act. Much evidence of ad-
ministrative weaknesses existed in published hearings and reports under other
subject titles, but no one appears to have seen the relationship, assembled
the evidence and coordinated it with the annual consideration of the War
Powers Act.19 Considerable Congressional concern20 has been expressed over
the great lack of competition in defense procurement as a result of what has
been considered to be abuse of the privilege of negotiated procurement under
section 2(c) (1) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,21 and vari-
ous attempts have been made to curb that abuse. But that Act contains no
specific authority to conduct procurement without competition. It does spe-
cifically authorize negotiated procurement without advertising. However, only
title II of the First War Powers Act, together with Executive Order No. 10210,
specifically authorizes a waiver of both advertising and competition. 22 There-
fore, any administrative practice of relying on the Armed Services Procure-
ment Act of 1947, rather than on title II and Executive Order 10210, as
authority for waiving competition in procurement appears to be without clear
19 For example, facts showing progress payments granted so unduly automatically as to produce
tremendous unliquidated balances, as disclosed in Small Business Committee hearings, later dis-
cussed, and apparently designed to secure even greater liberality in such payments, would seem
vitally important for the consideration of the Judiciary Committees of Congress when considering
the wisdom of extending the duration of title II, the only authority for such payments.
20 Hearings [No. 42) before the House Committee on Armed Services on H. R. 7995 and H. R.
8499, to Amend the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 5039, 5078
(1956).
2162 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. 151, 153 (1952).
22 See especially parag. 5 of Executive Order No. 10210.
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legal validity. But when extension of the duration of title I1 annually is pro-
posed in Congress, the failure to assemble from the debates, hearings, etc.,
the accumulated evidence of administrative abuse of negotiated procurement
has produced an erroneous impression of the extent to which administration
of the Act and the executive order has been satisfactory.
A somewhat similar situation exists with respect to the administration
of progress payments. Such payments are not authorized by the Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Act. That Act authorizes advance payments which are not
the same as progress payments, as will later be shown. Nevertheless, the
indications of possible administrative weaknesses in granting progress pay-
ments, as shown in legislative hearings,23 do not appear to have been con-
sidered in the extension of title II, and the impression has been created that
there are no weaknesses in the Act in that respect.
The failure to coordinate the available relevant information on nego-
tiated procurement and progress payments apparently accounts, in part at least,
for the concentration on the power to amend contracts without consideration
in almost complete disregard of the administration of the other powers. Only
a report based upon the facts relied upon to conclude that failure to amend
would cause the Government to lose a source of supply indispensable to the
national defense would seem sufficient to enable Congress to decide whether
that part of the Act was being administered in the best interests of the Gov-
ernment. It has not been found that any such report has ever been requested
or presented. In view of the conflicting testimony on the standards used to
determine eligibility for an amendment without consideration, it seems strange
that Congress was not more curious to learn just how the actual cases had
been resolved. If a spot check disclosed unwarranted relief allowed in but
a few cases, it would not appear reasonable in the best interests of the Gov-
ernment to conclude that there were only a few of the same type among all
of the rest of the cases not checked. If the action in those cases were of pub-
lic record, perhaps Congress would have insisted on an opportunity to evaluate
the eligilibity standards used in the various cases. But failure to make the
record in such cases available for public examination is a factor which alone
may well account for many of the questionable features of the Act and its
administration.
Had the available information on negotiated procurement and progress
payments-along with a disclosure of actual cases showing the extent to which
efforts have been made to establish that relief under the Act was essential to
facilitate the national defense-been included each year in a comprehensive
23 Hearings, supra notes 2, 13 and 16.
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public report on all phases of the Act's administration, it seems clear that
the public would have found it extremely difficult to understand the necessity
or wisdom of continuing the Act, at least as administered. The record shows
that at the time it reactivated the War Powers Act, Congress intended to se-
cure such a report, 4 but it is clear that it never was secured in any of the
various years when the Act was extended. For example, the report on the
first extension of the Act, after its reactivation, in 1951, for one year, con-
tains no report by the President on the actual administration of it to show
whether the interests of the Government were adequately protected, as con-
templated by the Act. Instead, the Committee report merely contains cer-
tain statistics on Defense Department action and the Committee's indorsement
of the Senate Small Business Committee's recommendation that the Depart-
ment's policy be broadened to include relief to contractors not essential to
the national defense. 5
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Title II of the First War Powers Act, as amended, sometimes herein re-
ferred to as the Act, or as title II, is as follows:
"The President may authorize any department or agency of the Govern-
ment exercising functions in connection with the national defense, in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the President for the protection of the interests
of the Government, to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifica-
tions of contracts heretofore or hereafter made and to make advance, progress
and other payments thereon, without regard to the provisions of law relating
to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of contracts whenever
he deems such action would facilitate the national defense: Provided, That
nothing herein shall be construed to authorize the use of the cost-plus-a-per-
centage-of-cost system of contracting: Provided further, That nothing herein
24 S. REP. No. 2686, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950): "The effect of the termination date will
be to permit the Congress to obtain reports relative to the provisions of the bill and the need for
their continuation before the expiration date."
25 S. REP. 1498, supra note 4, at 4-6. Recognition of the need for more meaningful periodic re-
ports on procurement methods by the executive branch of the Government is shown in House
Report No. 1688, 84th Congress, 2d Session (1956) by the House Armed Services Committee on
Amendments to the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, at page 8: "We propose that the
trend shall be toward advertised competitive procurement and that advertised competitive procure-
ment will be the rule; that in every case in which the agency head or his subordinates look toward
the exceptions of the act, they are met with the expression of congressional intent in this act, as
amended, that what they do must be supported by a justification which is both clear and convincing.
And the Congress will examine the findings that are required under this act from time to time, to
determine whether this mandate is being followed. We are determined that the trend which
prompted this inquiry shall be reversed." (Emphasis added.) Page 11 of the House report refers
to section (G) of the amendment involved which would require semiannual reports to the Congress
upon the administration of the Act and enable Congress to have a continuing look at the methods
of procurement. The "trend" referred to is only one of the powers involved in the First War
Powers Act and Executive Order 9001 which more expressly than the Armed Services Procurement
Act of 1947 permits a waiver of competition as well as advertising. It would seem reasonable to
expect that Congress would be equally interested in periodic reports on the War Powers Act to be
certain that what has been done under that Act is "supported by justification which is both clear
and convincing."
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shall be construed to authorize any contracts in violation of existing law relat-
ing to limitation of profits: Provided further, That all acts under the authority
of this section shall be made a matter of public record under regulations pre-
scribed by the President, and when deemed by him not to be incompatible
with the public interest: Provided further, That all contracts entered into,
amended, or modified pursuant to authority contained in this section shall in-
clude a clause to the effect that the Comptroller General of the United States
or any of his duly authorized representatives shall have access to and the right
to examine any pertinent books, documents, papers, and records of the con-
tractor or any of his subcontractors engaged in the performance of and involv-
ing transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts." (Emphasis added.)
In view of the unprecedented nature of the powers granted by the Act
to the President, and the Act's stipulation of regulations to be prescribed by
the President, it seems clear that the Act contemplates a high degree of over-
all accountability by the President as distinguished from the accountability
chargeable to the heads of the various agencies and departments, which are
authorized to exercise the powers granted under the Act. The whole func-
tioning of the Act initially is entirely dependent upon a determination by the
President that the exercise of those powers "would facilitate the national
defense." That is, the Act empowers the President to authorize the agencies
involved to exercise the powers described whenever he deems, not whenever
they deem, such action would facilitate the national defense. Also, nothing
in the Act can be construed as an authorization to the President to tell the
agencies to make such a determination in lieu of the determination which
the Act requires him to make. Yet that is precisely what President Truman
did in paragraphs 4 and 9 of his executive order implementing the Act. It
appears obvious that the Act requires the Office of the President to be some-
thing more than a mere conduit between Congress and the agencies and that
the mere issuance of an executive order would not relieve the President from
his accountability to Congress. In fact, it seems doubtful that a law, which re-
quires "regulations prescribed by the President for the protection of the in-
terests of the Government" is, even in that respect alone, satisfied by an
executive order which delegates to the Secretary of Defense the President's
responsibility for prescribing the regulations to be followed.
Among much other information on the administration of the various
phases of the Act, it would seem that Congress (and the public) would have
been very interested to be fully informed on the results of the Act's reactiva-
tion of the forty-five "distress" contracts under which the Defense Department
stated the contractors were facing possible bankruptcy because of fixed prices
in such contracts.2 If the failure to rescue any of those contractors would
26 S. REP., supra note 24, at 2.
1957.1
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not have meant the loss of an indispensable source of supply, it is not clear
how the Department justified relief under the Act to that part of the forty-
five on the ground that it would facilitate the national defense. The only
organized information ever furnished the public on the administration of the
Act was that published approximately four years ago by the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business"7 ; but instead of furnishing a report on all the
important phases of the Act to show whether the extraordinary powers au-
thorized by it were being exercised in the best interests of the Government,
the report concentrates for the most part on the Government's failure to give
relief to contractors seeking to increase their contract prices by amendments
without consideration from the contractors involved, in a few cases of very
questionable merit. 8 Perhaps no more comprehensive treatment of the ad-
ministration of the Act was required of the Senate Small Business Committee.
However, a report under the title used by that committee only emphasizes the
irony of the omission of a report, under the same title, by committees which
were directly concerned, such as the Committee on Expenditures in the Execu-
tive Department (now the Committee on Government Operations) and the
Judiciary Committee which annually passes upon the wisdom of continuing
the life of the Act.
2 9
So far as could be ascertained, none of the Presidents, to whom Congress
entrusted the full discretion to determine the propriety of using the unprece-
dented powers under the Act, has ever submitted a report to the Congress on
his execution of those powers and his reasons for concluding that continua-
tion of those powers was clearly essential to the continued effectiveness of
the mobilization program. It is true that the Executive Office of the President,
through the Bureau of the Budget has annually communicated its recommenda-
tion for continuation of the Act, but those communications have been nothing
more than the mere recommendation itself. That is, the executive communi-
cation has furnished Congress no Presidential evaluation of the competency
with which the Act was administered to date. And while the agencies have
presented more detailed reasons for extending the life of the Act, they also
have failed to furnish a report of any significance on the administration of
the Act. But it was in the President that Congress placed full responsibility
for determining the necessity of exercising the powers. Therefore, it seems
clear that the primary responsibility for the issuance of such a report is not
lodged in the agencies. It does not appear to have been mere circumstance
that Congress failed to make the executive agencies responsible for the admin-
27 S. REP. No. 1459, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); also see Sparkman article, based almost en-
tirely on S. REP. 1459, supra note 12.
28 Id. at 11-21.
29 Hearings, supra note 13, at 35-36.
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istration of the Act. The record shows that the choice was a conscious one.
To be consistent, then, it would seem reasonable to expect that Congress, and
the public as well, would not look to the agencies, which conceivably would
want to perpetuate the powers as long as possible, for a full accounting and
evaluation. If the Act in question were ordinary in nature, a routine letter
from the Budget Director as is customary with respect to such acts would not
be surprising. But the War Powers Act is extraordinary and unprecedented.
It therefore would seem entitled to something more than ordinary treatment.
THE COMPETENCY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 10210 AS A FULFILLMENT
OF EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ACT
It will be noted that the enumerated paragraphs in the order are not,
for the most part, regulations but instead a further specification of the powers
conferred.,, a If Congress intended, by the Act, to permit the agencies to have
a carte blanche, as the existing executive order No. 10210 appears to give
them, it is not clear why Congress made the functioning of the Act depend
upon a determination by the President and then only pursuant to regulations
prescribed by the President for the protection of the interests of the Govern-
ment. It is difficult to perceive how the custodian of such extraordinary
powers as were granted by the Act could conclude that he should be able fully
to comply with the law and to account for his stewardship by delegating
the entire discretion to be exercised, unaccompanied by any understanding of
the circumstances in which such discretion would be exercised."b The diffi-
culties encountered in attempting to understand the matter find no mitigation
in the possibility that there may have existed an extremely high degree of
confidence between the custodian of the powers and the agency heads to the
extent that it seemed safe to risk executive accountability in the hands of
those directly concerned rather than in the hands of a commission or similar
body with sufficient detachment to see that the Act actually was always admin-
istered so as to protect the interests of the Government. The executive order
does not limit the exercise of discretion to the heads of the pertinent agen-
cies but extends it "to any other military or civilian officer or officials of their
respective departments", who, in turn, might be permitted to make further
delegations of such authority. The sweeping nature of the executive delega-
tion of discretion as to regulations for the protection of the interests of the
30a An examination of Mr. Roosevelt's Executive Order No. 9001 (6 FED. REG. 6787 (1941))
issued pursuant to title II, will disclose that Mr. Roosevelt specifically referred to all paragraphs
after that dealing with advertised, competitive bidding, as regulations, whereas Mr. Truman's order
No. 10210, 16 FED. REG. 1049 (1951) does not identify them as regulations.
30b It is to be noted that the writer is not raising any questions at this point as to the President's
authority to delegate statutory functions and duties vested solely in him such as was involved in
the cases of Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498. 513 (1839); Williams v. United States, 1 How. 290,
297 (1840); United States v. Eliason, 16 Pet. 291 (1842); United States v. Page, 137 U.S. 673
(1891); United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1892).
1957.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Government is repeated in the President's delegation of the Act's requirement
that:
"[a]ll acts under this section shall be made a matter of public record under
regulations prescribed by the President and when deemed by him not to be in-
compatible with the public interest."
Instead of prescribing regulations as directed by the Act and which would
have afforded the public some means of keeping apprised of the competency
with which the Act was being administered-and in the same way furnishing
some restraining effect on the administrators, as Congress apparently intended
in that proviso of the Act-Executive Order No. 10210 merely states that the
agency heads:
"[s]hall make available for public inspection so much of such data as they
may respectively deem compatible with the public interest and as does not cover
classified contracts or purchases."
The public can find in the administrative regulations "' no more indication
as to what it may inspect than it finds in the Executive Order. Thus, the pub-
lic interest which might have been best served by the restraint Congress in-
tended to impose on the administration of the Act seems completely ignored
by both Mr. Truman and the agency heads.
When Mr. Truman issued Executive Order No. 10210 on February 2,
1951, "by virtue of the authority vested in me by the First War Powers Act,
1941, as amended by the act of January 12, 1951," the authority vested in
him was a limited authority that did not extend beyond June 30, 1952, the
expiration date specified in the Act. Therefore, the authority he delegated,
by his order, to the departments named in it also was a limited authority that
did not extend beyond June 30, 1952. While later legislation enacted on
June 30, 1952,82 amended the Act of January 12, 1951, by striking out "1952"
and inserting in lieu thereof "1953", the amendment had no control or bind-
ing effect on the order issued to make the original act operative. Since its
operation was entirely dependent upon the discretion of the President, Mr.
Truman on January 1, 1953, or at any other date prior to January 20, 1953,
had the authority to determine that the powers were no longer necessary and
thereupon could have rescinded the order. He did not rescind. Neither did
he issue any new order, or amendment to Executive Order No. 10210, to in-
crease the limited authority received by the departments under 'Executive
Order No. 10210. The agencies continued to cite 10210 and were doing so
when Mr. Eisenhower was inaugurated in January, 1953. They have con-
31 1 CCH GOV'T. CONTRACTS REP. parag. 21,751-21,768 (1952); IA CCH Gov'T. CONTRACTS
REP. parag. 24,805-24,809 (1952).
3266 STAT. 295 (1952), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
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tinued to do so regardless of the fact that no new order or declaration has
ever been issued by Mr. Eisenhower. With the amendment to the Act hav-
ing less than six months duration, and not only a new President but a different
political party accountable for the administration of the powers under the
Act, it would seem that a new executive order should have been issued. The
interests of the Government and, therefore, the public interest, would seem
to have been entitled to a new declaration of judgment, a new determination,
if not in January, then not later than June 30, 1953, when the Act, under
which the retiring President made his determination, was due to expire. The
Act and executive order should not be confused with the multitude of laws
and executive orders which continue to operate indefinitely regardless of po-
litical party or of the particular incumbent of the White House. Congress's
extension of the duration of the First War Powers Act, as distinguished from
the executive order, beyond June 30, 1953, did not create the same situation
as that involving an executive order based upon any act of Congress which
is unlimited in its duration. The First War Powers Act was not only one
extraordinary and unprecedented in nature generally and limited in its dura-
tion but one that is based upon great personal trust in the President. There-
fore, it does not appear reasonable to say that it was immaterial that Execu-
tive Order No. 10210 was issued by a president no longer in office. Clearly,
the Act does not contemplate exercise of its powers pursuant to a determina-
tion by Mr. Truman, after passage of an amendment extending the life of
the Act which is operative only on a determination by the President who, by
that time, was not Mr. Truman, but Mr. Eisenhower. Accordingly, it seems
unavoidable to suggest considerable doubt as to the validity of all actions
under the First War Powers Act since June 30, 1953.
For those who will argue against the suggestion of invalidity but, in the
absence of legal precedent, will attempt to rely on professed logic that the
agencies exercising the Act's powers were entitled to assume that the new
President adopted Mr. Truman's Executive Order No. 10210, an examination
of the defects in that order is especially important.
Since the operation of the Act is predicated upon the considered opinion,
a determination, by the President, that action thereunder would facilitate the
national defense, it would seem necessary that a new declaration of deter-
mination, showing the considered opinion of the incoming President, should
be express and not implied, especially in view of the extraordinary nature of
the powers granted by the Act and in view of the consolidation of discretion
in the President alone. The circumstances would seem to require that such
a declaration be either an express adoption of Executive Order No. 10210, if
it were the desire that the agencies continue to operate thereunder, or in the
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form of a new executive order which would issue only after due cognizance
of the weaknesses inherent in Executive Order No. 10210, and its adminis-
tration as described later in this article. Such a declaration would seem in-
dispensable to furnish the personal commitment to the obligations and re-
sponsibilities which the Act imposes to protect the interests of the Govern-
ment.a The failure to make such a declaration unfortunately tends to give
the impression that the administration of the powers granted by the Act is
not receiving the attention and consideration demanded by the extraordinary
nature of those powers. As the matter now stands, and as it has existed since
at least June 30, 1953, it can only be assumed that the determination required
by the Act is to be implied, that is, that there has been an exercise of the au-
thority under the Act by impliedly adopting Mr. Truman's exercise of the
authority granted to him; that simultaneously the considered opinion, the
determination, of Mr. Truman was adopted as the current executive opinion,
the current executive determination; and that the President has not only
adopted Executive Order No. 10210 as a competent implementation of the
Act but also the apparent satisfaction of Mr. Truman that the administration
of the Act involved no weaknesses serious enough to make any new express
declaration of purpose and requirements. Yet long before January 20, 1953,
there were very serious weaknesses in the executive order itself as well as in
the manner in which certain parts of it were being administered. Those weak-
nesses were not difficult to find by an examination of the available evidence
on various items of the order. Moreover, appropriate consideration of those
weaknesses should have disclosed the fairly obvious possibility that weakness
in one aspect may well have had a tendency to intensify the weakness of an-
other aspect and vice versa. For example, the encouragement given to con-
tingent fee agents by the Government's continued use of the contingent fee
covenant without enforcing it naturally is increased by the extreme use of
negotiated purchases, the type where such an agent has greater opportunities
to demonstrate his indispensability to the potential contractor. At the same
time, a preponderance of procurement by negotiation easily could tend to in-
crease the number of contingent fee agents.
The many defects hereinafter noted in Executive Order No. 10210 would
seem to be most persuasive to show not only that the executive order never
had any substantial executive consideration and evaluation after January 20,
1953, and that it was never consciously adopted, but also that the best inter-
ests of the Government as well as the language itself, demand that the Act
3aa Cf. Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543,547 (1886): "This implies that he is himself
to consider . . . and decide personally .... .Such a power he cannot delegate . . . . He may
call others to his assistance in making his examinations and in informing himself as to what ought
to be done, but his judgment, when pronounced, must be his own good judgment and not that of
another."
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be construed as requiring an express declaration of determination by the new
President not later than June 30, 1953.
ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 10210
It seems important to examine Mr. Truman's Executive Order No. 10210
to determine whether it is reasonable to conclude that in January 1953, or
some time prior to that date, the President took an appropriate look at Mr.
Truman's order, found it good as well as the administration of it, and for that
reason adopted it, as well as the administration of it, as his own; and that
he therefore issued no new order and made no express declaration of policy
under 10210.
At the time of the President's inauguration on January 20, 1953, it was
clear that the preamble was not accurate without an insertion after the paren-
thetical statement, "(Public Law 921, 81st Congress)", as follows: "64 Stat.
1257, as amended by the Act of June 30, 1952, 66 Stat. 295, 50 App. U.S.C.
611." In less than six months after the inauguration, the preamble should
also have contained a reference to the amending "Act of June 30, 1953, 63
Stat. 132."
The more important weakness in the preamble is in its statement of
determination by President Truman that the use of the Act's powers (such
as making advance, progress and other payments) "will facilitate the national
defense", when compared with paragraph 4 of the order which requires the
same determination to be made by "the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the
Navy, or the Air Force, respectively, or their duly authorized representatives",
and paragraph 9 of the order which requires that before advance payments
are made, there shall be a determination "that such payments will promote
[not "facilitate"] the national defense." Those facts seem to raise a question
as to the extent to which the presidential determination has any significance
in the light of the Act which requires that the determination shall be made
by the President. It seems clear that the presidential determination has little
if any true significance because it is followed by a sweeping, and apparently
unauthorized, delegation of authority to make the same determination that
the Act specifically limited to the President alone. The effect of such delega-
tion is to place the discretion of exercising the powers under the Act in an
unlimited and unknown number of individuals, completely contrary to the
specific language of the Act. Therefore, it appears extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to conclude from an examination of a very small portion of Ex-
ecutive Order No. 10210, that the order had a careful presidential appraisal
and evaluation after January 20, 1953.
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If all of the important facts on the administration of the Act to date
had been assembled to show the lack of definite, relevant standards in its
administration and the questionable cases in which the war powers had been
used, it seems at least doubtful that on January 20 or on July 1, 1953, any
executive order would have adopted a determination made on February 2,
1951, that use of the Act's powers "will facilitate the national defense." Only
the knowledge that there had been an executive examination and evaluation
of the facts previously relied upon to justify a continuation of those powers
after July 1, 1953, would seem to support a conclusion that the President
adopted the considered opinion, the determination, of Mr. Truman that the
continuance of the powers, as administered, would facilitate the national de-
fense. It appears very doubtful that such an examination and evaluation
occurred at any time between the election in November 1952, and July 1, 1953.
Yet, if any action taken under the Act after July 1, 1953, may be considered
to have any semblance of legality, it is necessary to assume that the President
impliedly adopted as his own Mr. Truman's considered opinion in Executive
Order 10210.
A letter " from the President's Budget Director favorably reporting on
the proposed bill to extend the duration of the Act, as distinguished from
Executive Order 10210, and advising that it was in accord with the program
of the President, is hardly sufficient to show that the pertinent facts of the
matter had been considered and evaluated for the President. On the contrary,
the letter tends to support the assumption that the facts involved have never
had any substantial Presidential consideration and evaluation. The letter
shows that the Defense Department initiated the bill and that the Depart-
ment negotiated directly, rather than through the President from whom the
Department's authority, if any, to exercise the powers under the Act was de-
rived. And it is practically certain that if the Budget Director possessed a
copy of the "explanatory material" referred to in his letter, such material,
prepared, as it appears to have been, by the Defense Department, did not
contain the important facts on the administration of the powers to date. Com-
ing as it did from the Budget Director of a new President and of a different
political party, it would seem to have been clearly in the public interest for
the House Judiciary Committee to whom the Budget Director's letter was ad-
dressed, to request a presidential evaluation of the Act before extending its
duration rather than to accept the evaluation of the Defense Department with-
out confirmation by the President.
However, there is one especially persuasive indication that there was little,
if any, presidential evaluation of the words, "facilitate the national defense,"
S3bH. R. REP. No. 558, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953).
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in the preamble of Executive Order 10210, during the period November 1,
1952, to July 1, 1953. In the letter from the President's Budget Director,
continuation of title II of the First War Powers Act was stated to be clearly
essential. The General Services Administration also reported the matter as
"essential" " and the Defense Department's use of the words "vitally neces-
sary" in its report of January 25, 1953, placed it in accord with the others
who presented the matter to Congress as something essential, that is, some-
thing most important, indispensable." But essentiality is something much more
than a matter which merely facilitates or makes less difficult. Therefore, it
seems impossible to conclude that an executive order which depends upon
legislation based upon declarations of essentiality, is a responsible execution
of that legislation if the order is predicated upon something much less than
essentiality. The fact that Congress apparently did not take cognizance of
the significant difference in the terminology involved and failed to substitute
"essential" for "facilitate" in its extension of the Act offered no justification
for the use of language in an executive order which ignores the character of
the proposition presented to Congress. As it now stands, the record gives the
impression that the various proponents of the legislation to extend the Act
decided they would not be successful if they sought the legislation on the
mere ground that it would make the national defense effort less difficult and,
accordingly, presented the matter as something essential, indispensable, but
after accomplishing their objective, proceeded to abandon the base of essen-
tiality. Nothing less than a declaration in an appropriate executive order
effective July 1, 1953, that "such action is essential to [in lieu of "will facili-
tate"] the national defense", or that any use of the war powers must be based
upon a determination that such use is essential to the national defense, would
have been consistent with the agency reports to Congress that continuation
of the Act was essential to the national defense.
There are many parts of Executive Order 10210, in addition to the pre-
amble, which raise serious doubts that it was consciously adopted in toto after
careful evaluation. Paragraph 1 of the order, which authorizes the Defense
Department to enter into contracts and into amendments or modifications of
contracts without regard to the provisions of law relating to the making, per-
formance, amendment or modification of contracts, should have inserted after
the word law ". . . except title II of the First War Powers Act, 1941, as
amended, and certain other laws involved in later paragraphs hereof . . . "
inasmuch as the Act itself was a "law relating to the making, performance,
amendment, or modification of contracts," and paragraphs 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13,
34 Ibid.
35 Id. at 5-6
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14 and 16 of the executive order involve laws relating to contracts. Para-
graph 3 of the Order involves a further abandonment of the essentiality base
as presented to Congress. It not only provides for contracts for "things and
services" which are "necessary" but also for the much more nebulous and un-
predictable, those which are "appropriate or convenient" for the national de-
fense. Paragraph 4 also ignores the essentiality base in authorizing the
modification, amendment or settlement of claims and follows the preamble
predicated on anything that will facilitate, make less difficult, the national
defense. Further, the power to adjust claims authorized in that paragraph
ignores the importance of having that function concentrated in the General
Accounting Office where all debits and credits of the United States should be
coordinated. 6 If, and it would appear extremely doubtful that the defense
effort would suffer by omitting that part of paragraph 3 from the executive
order, it should have been supplemented to require a routine GAO report on
debits and credits there of record, before final action by the Defense Depart-
ment.
The extent to which liquidated damages are considered to have been
included in the contract price " would appear to require some modification
of the authority to release all accrued liquidated damages. The authoriza-
tion, in paragraph 4, of amendments and modifications of contracts irrespec-
tive of the "form of the contract amended or modified" is in conflict with
paragraphs 10 and 11 of the order which require certain provisions in every
contract "amended, or modified pursuant to this order," and the authority to
amend or modify "irrespective of the . .. form . . . of the amending or
modifying contract" is in conflict with paragraphs 7, 10 and 11. Insertion
of a phrase after the words, "modifying contracts," such as, "except as other-
wise provided in this order," would have removed these conflicts. While the
exigencies of the emergency existent in December, 1941, may have justified
the quality of the draftsmanship used in the executive order issued at that
time, it is difficult to perceive any necessity for perpetuating it not only through
the Korean emergency but long thereafter when a new President of a different
political party became responsible for the administration of the Act.
Moreover, the whole context of paragraph 4 is somewhat ambiguous
when read in the light of paragraph 1 which, pursuant to President Truman's
determination that it will facilitate the national defense, authorizes all of
the powers, referred to in paragraph 4, irrespective of whether it is admin-
istratively determined that the exercise of them will facilitate the national
defense. Yet paragraph 4 proceeds to require an administrative determina-
3642 STAT. 23, 24 (1921), 31 U.S.C. 41, 71 (1952).
37 See note 5 supra.
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tion that the national defense be facilitated unless the matter involves an
amendment or modification of a contract, whereas the preamble shows that
determination was previously made and was required, by the Act, to be made
solely by the President. If an amendment or a modification be involved,
paragraph 4 states the matter may be accomplished "with or without con-
sideration." Since that is to be implied from paragraph 1, its specification in
paragraph 4 with respect to amendments and modifications causes its omis-
sion with respect to all of the other powers mentioned in the same paragraph
to suggest the possibility that consideration is required as to the other powers.
At least, it is difficult to understand how another president, of another po-
litical party, could have consciously adopted the exact language of paragraph
4 as his own.
In paragraph 5 of the Order, competitive bidding, as well as advertising
for bids, is waived. As shown later in this article, even the Defense De-
partment believes that competition is desirable and possible in its negotiated
purchases which constitute the great bulk of its procurement activities. It
seems fairly clear that well before July 1, 1953, it was not essential to the
national defense to negotiate procurement without competition. Mr. Truman's
letter of December 18, 1950,8 does not indicate that it was essential and De-
fense letter of January 24, 1953,"0 makes no reference to any necessity of pro-
curement without competition.
Paragraph 6 requires the Department of Defense to maintain complete
data as to all contracts and purchases made pursuant to the Act and the Order
whereas Executive Order 9001,40 predecessor of Executive Order 10210, re-
quired such data to be reported periodically to the President. The require-
ment of the earlier order would seem to be more consistent with the respon-
sibility which the Act places upon the President and would seem to have a
restraining effect upon the agencies exercising the powers. Therefore, the
retention of paragraph 6 as contained in Executive Order 10210 does not
support any presumption that Executive Order 10210 became the considered
opinion of the President in January or July, 1953. The last sentence of para-
graph 6 would seem to support a strong contrary presumption. An order
which directs the agency heads to make available for public inspection so
much of the pertinent data "as they may deem compatible with the public
interest" seems to fall far short of the Act's specific requirement that "all
acts under the authority of this section shall be made a matter of public rec-
ord under regulations prescribed by the President and when deemed by him
38H. R. REP. No. 3227, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
39 Supra note 33 at 5-6.
40 6 FED. REG. 6787 (1941), 32 C.F.R. Sect. 7.103-20, 590.503 (1954).
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not to be incompatible with the public interest." It is clear from the use of
the word, "and", in that part of the Act, that the compatibility determination
was not to be a part of the regulations which the President could delegate
to the agencies. That fact alone, like many others with equal individual sig-
nificance as heretofore mentioned, is compelling evidence that Executive Order
10210 should have been supplanted by a new order effective not later than
July 1, 1953.
During the period between the issuance of Mr. Truman's executive order
and July 1, 1953, when a new executive order would seem to have been re-
quired, the Assignment of Claims Act of 1940 "' had been amended. There-
fore, any new executive order on title II of the War Powers Act should have
added the words, "as amended," to that designated as paragraph 8 in Execu-
tive Order 10210.
The indications later referred to in this article that progress payments
have not been well administered, and in some instances perhaps granted auto-
matically, suggests ample ground for questioning the wisdom of stating para-
graph 9 of the Executive Order 10210 so as to provide that only "Advance
[but not progress] payments shall be made hereunder only after careful scru-
tiny to determine that such payments will promote the national defense." "
Also, this appears to be an unauthorized delegation of responsibility for a
determination which Congress placed in the sole discretion of the President.
And if the presidential determination stated in the preamble to the order is
to be given its natural significance, the President already has determined that
the use of advance payments will facilitate the national defense. The use
of the word, "promote", in paragraph 9 is another instance where the essen-
tiality base has been abandoned for something much less, and, it would seem,
something at least different, if not less, than the facilitation base used in the
preamble and certain other parts of the order. It is conceivable, though not
certain, that anything that would make less difficult (facilitate) the national
defense would help (promote) it. But it would not seem necessarily to fol-
low that anything that would help (promote) national defense would make
it less difficult (facilitate). Therefore, it is not at all certain that if Execu-
tive Order 10210 had received appropriate consideration and evaluation prior
to July 1, 1953, Mr. Truman's use of the word "promote" in paragraph 9
would have been approved by his successor.
Long before July 1, 1953, the Defense Department, through its Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, had made it clear that it would not en-
41 54 STAT. 1029 (1940), as amended, 61 STAT. 501 (1947), 65 STAT. 41 (1951), 31 U.S.C.
203 (1952), 41 U.S.C. 15 (1952).
42 For distinctions as to the two types of payments, compare 1 CCH GOV'T. CONTRACTS REP.
parag. 23075-23087 (1952) with hearings, supra note 16 at 325-341.
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force the warranty required by paragraph 10 of Executive Order 10210 un-
less there was evidence of the use of influence, a standard that is completely
irrelevant to the standards stated in the exception phrase of the warranty.
The General Services Administration's regulations on the interpretation of
the warranty were, and still are, equally as irrelevant and a Joint Congres-
sional Committee had published its counsel's opinion that the administrative
agencies of the Government were interpreting the warranty very liberally and
that Congress might one day eliminate the warranty.4" Thus, the President
was on notice from more than one part of the Government that the warranty
was not being enforced. Further, he was on notice that the warranty was
paid for by the taxpayers" like any other provision of a Government con-
tract.4" In such circumstances, it is inconceivable that if Executive Order 10210
had actually received any significant presidential consideration and evaluation,
paragraph 10 would never have been retained without the obviously necessary
enforcement "regulations prescribed by the President for the protection of the
interests of the Government," as referred to in the Act.
ADMINISTRATION OF NEGOTIATED PROCUREMENT
Prior to December 18, 1941, when the First War Powers Act was passed
and title II thereof permitted the President to authorize any department or
agency of the Government, exercising functions in connection with the na-
tional defense, to enter into contracts without regard to the provisions of law
relating to the making of contracts, the law made few significant exceptions
in its requirement that purchases and contracts for supplies or services for
the Government be made or entered into only after appropriate advertising
for proposals.46
By Executive Order No. 9001, of December 27, 1941, in which he deter-
mined that such action would facilitate the war effort, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt authorized the War Department, the Navy Department, and the
United States Maritime Commission to enter into contracts without regard to
the pertinent provisions of law and, in paragraph 4 of the order, specifically
stated, without exception or qualification, that advertising and competitive
bidding need not be required. 41  While the authority granted in title II and
9001 to contract without advertising or competition was not withdrawn after
World War II ended, Congress, on February 19, 1948, enacted the Armed
43 Hearing before Joint Congressional Committee on Defense Production (Defense Production
Act Progress Report No. 7), 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
44 Hearings before the Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments, Investigating Influence in Government Procurement, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
11, 607 (1949).
45 See note 5 supra; H. R. REP. No. 2356, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1942).
46 REv. STAT. sect. 3709 (1875), 41 U.S.C. Sect. 5 (1952).
47 6 FED. REG. 6787 (1941), 32 C.F.R. sect. 7.103-20, 590.503 (1954).
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Services Procurement Act of 1947 48 which provides in section 2(c) that all
purchases and contracts for supplies and seryices shall be made by advertising
as provided in section 3, but then proceeds to list seventeen exceptions in
which purchases and contracts may be negotiated by the agency head without
advertising. Somewhat over a year after the passage of the 1947 Act, with
Title II and 9001 still in existence, Congress passed the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 41 which provides in section 252(c) that
all purchases and contracts for supplies and services shall be made by adver-
tising, as provided in section 253, but lists fourteen exceptions to the adver-
tising requirement.
The first and last exceptions in both the 1947 and the 1949 acts permit
purchases and contracts to be negotiated by the agency head without adver-
tising if "determined to be necessary in the public interest during the period
of a national emergency declared by the President or by the Congress," " or
if "otherwise authorized by law," respectively. Later, when hostilities in
Korea necessitated an acceleration of procurement activity, and members of
Congress were called to the White House, it is reported that the President
chiefly urged as the necessity for issuing a proclamation of national emergency,
that the 1947 act would then be in effect." That proclamation was issued
by President Truman on December 16, 1950. On December 18, 1950, the
President addressed a letter " to the President of the Senate and requested
legislation along the lines of title II of the First War Powers Act of 1941,
urging that title II powers again be made available so long as the emergency
should last. In that letter, the President, apparently referring to section
2(c) (1) of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, stated that the au-
thority to let contracts through negotiation could then be exercised as a result
of the declaration of a national emergency, but that there was considerable
doubt as to whether authority then existed for modifying contracts.
In the hearings on the bill to comply with the President's request, it was
indicated that opinions among lawyers differed as to whether the Armed Serv-
ices Procurement Act of 1947, by implication at least, repealed title II of the
War Powers Act of 1941."' In response to an inquiry by a member of the
Senate as to why the War Powers Act did not entirely supersede the 1947
Act since the War Powers Act granted the power to disregard the provisions
of law relating to the making, performance, amendment, or modification of
48 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. 151, 153 (1952).
4963 STAT. 377 (1949), 41 U.S.C. 252 (1952).
5062 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. sect. 151 (1952); 63 STAT. 377 (1949), 41 U.S.C. sect. 252
(1952).
51 Supra note 13 at 33.
52 Id. at 5.
52 id. at 32.
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contracts, a representative of the Army expressed the view that the War
Powers Act supplemented the 1947 Act " but did not explain the basis of
his view. Actually, insofar as the award of contracts is concerned, title II of
the War Powers Act implemented rather than supplemented the 1947 Act.
Title II permits procurement without either advertising or competition whereas
section 2(c) (1) of the 1947 Act waives advertising only " and thus may be
said to require competition in negotiation. However, section 17 of the same
Act permits the negotiation of purchases and contracts without advertising if
*'otherwise authorized by law", and it is title II which furnishes that authority.
In that way, title II, when it is itself implemented by a proper executive order,
furnishes the necessary implementation of the 1947 Act. So long as title II
remains in existence and the validity of that executive order unchallenged,
section 2(c) (1) of the 1947 Act appears superfluous. Clearly, it cannot be
said that the existence of section 2(c) (1) of the 1947 Act removes the need
for the War Powers Act.5" If agencies limit their negotiations to one con-
tractor, in some instances, then their authority to do so is not in section 2 (c) (1)
but in section 17 of the 1947 Act as implemented by title II of the War Powers
Act as extended by executive order. It has been said that in most cases, ne-
gotiation is carried on with several firms so that competition as to price exists
to some degree." However, it is important not to overlook the fact that it
is title II and not the 1947 Act, by and of itself, which permits the military
departments not only to negotiate their contracts but also to negotiate with-
out competition.
On January 12, 1951, Congress amended title II of the War Powers Act
to state specifically that it be effective during the national emergency,58 when-
ever the President deemed action thereunder would facilitate the national de-
fense, but not beyond June 30, 1952. However, on February 2, 1951, when
President Truman issued Executive Order No. 10210, which like its predeces-
sor, 9001, stated in paragraph 5, without exception or qualification, that ad-
vertising and competitive bidding need not be required, he provided in para-
graph 16 that
"Nothing herein contained shall prejudice any authority to utilize the pro-
visions of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 (62 Stat. 26) and regu-
lations thereunder."
5 Id. at 32-33.
55 62 STAT. 21 (1948), 41 U.S.C. 151, 153 (1952).
50 The War Powers Act also is needed so long as Congress believes progress payments are
necessary. That Act is the only authority for them since the 1947 Procurement Act authorizes advance,
not progress, payments. That fact seems to have been overlooked on more than one occasion.
57 Supra note 20 at 5119.
58 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
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Since the executive order provides the necessary implementation of the 1947
Act, insofar as original procurement commitments are concerned, it could
hardly be said to prejudice the authority to use it.
With the act of January 12, 1951, reactivating title II, extended each
year and in 1955, extended to June 30, 1957," 9 and with Executive Order No.
10210 apparently considered to be still in effect, permitting any and all con-
tract procurement without advertised competitive bidding, any concern about
the desirability and the wisdom of any exceptions in the 1947 and 1949 acts, 0
such as section 2(c) (1) of the 1947 act, seems somewhat academic and un-
warranted. So long as title II and 10210 are permitted to exist, and the va-
lidity of Executive Order 10210 since June 30, 1953, not successfully chal-
lenged, it appears clear that the executive agencies involved, if they choose to
do so, are entirely free to, and cannot be held accountable if they do, ignore any
limitations the 1947 and 1949 acts might be said to have. While the House
Armed Services Committee, which was considering certain bills to restrict pro-
curement by negotiation, was reminded of the effect of the continued exist-
ence of Executive Order 102 10,61 it seemed willing to allow title II to remain
for the whole period of its present duration notwithstanding its concern that
negotiation may have almost supplanted advertised competitive bidding, " espe-
cially because of the emphasis still placed on the national emergency declared
by President Truman in December, 1950.
It is stated in a memorandum by the committee counsel that in the case
of the Air Force, negotiation has practically taken over the procurement sys-
tem.13 And the committee report states that for the thirty-month period from
January 1, 1953, to June 30, 1955, the three service departments, reporting
monthly within the Department of Defense, report a total contract commit-
ment of $36,367,486,000, of which 94.19 percent was let on negotiated pro-
curement and 5.81 per cent ($2,111,354,000) was let as a result of competitive
bidding." In view of those figures, the committee concluded that the de-
partments have by a consistent progressive increase in the use of an exception
in the Armed Services Procurement Act practically scrapped the traditional
system of free advertised competitive bidding. Yet it has not been found that
such fact was presented prior to June 30, 1955, when Congress extended until
June 30, 1957, the operation of title II of the First War Powers Act which
is the only authority to scrap the system.
59 68 STAT. 322 (1955), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
66 See notes 48 and 49 supra.
cl Supra note 20 at 5016.
62 Id. at 5003-5004; 5031-5075.
63 Id. at 5027.
64 Id. at 5029.
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It appears that in August 1954, the Department of Defense may have
become aware of the presence of abuses under negotiation procedures, but if
so, the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee 65 fails to show that the ad-
ministration of negotiation procedures under title II was evaluated at the time
the Judiciary Committee was considering the extension of that title through
June 30, 1957. It is fairly certain that the excessive use of negotiated pro-
curement was given little, if any, consideration at the time the extension of
title II was being deliberated, notwithstanding the fact that such method of
procurement is an important part of the Act. Approximately two months
before the Judiciary Committee report, the Senate Small Business Committee
had reported the receipt of complaints every year from sellers that the Gov-
ernment continues to purchase an increasing share of its goods and materials
by negotiated rather than by advertised contracts. That report also declared
that since 1950 approximately 90 percent of the dollar value of all purchasing
has been awarded by negotiation, and that the emergency exception had been
widely used to justify that sharp departure from the basic method of adver-
tising.
In a letter 6 presented to the committee, the chairman of the House Select
Committee for Small Business supported the bill before the committee to take
away the national emergency proclamation powers of the President. He cited
the experience of small-business concerns in negotiated versus advertised com-
petitive contracts. He pointed out to the committee that 64 percent of the
dollar value of all advertised competitive contracts in the thirty-month period
surveyed by the committee had been won by small-business concerns. In his
opinion, the position of small-business concerns in negotiation was less favor-
able, therefore, than advertised competitive bidding, notwithstanding the pro-
visions of the Small Business Act, as amended, with respect to the negotiation
of contracts.
About a year previously, in the fifth annual report 67 of the Senate Select
Committee on Small Business, it is stated that the statistics provided the com-
mittee do not uniformly reveal whether small businesses receive more con-
tracts under one system or the other but that the small-businessman cannot
understand why the Armed Forces tend to flout the intent of Congress, and it
is argued that they might have a chance to bid on contracts which are adver-
tised, whereas when negotiation is used, they do not hear about the procure-
ment and are thus precluded from submitting a bid or proposal. And in its
f,5 S. REp. No. 354, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
66 H. R. REP. No. 1688, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1956).
67 S. REP. No. 129, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1955).
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sixth annual report,68 it is stated that the small-business community generally
is satisfied that it has a better opportunity to participate upon an advertised
procurement than it does on a negotiated procurement and that the committee
shares that belief primarily because of the more widespread information con-
cerning advertised procurement
With the life of title II, which was reactivated by reason of a declared
emergency and annually extended by Congress on the theory of a continued
emergency, and with the validity of Executive Order 10210 unchallenged, it
is easily seen how the departments affected would feel completely justified
in an extensive use of negotiated procurement without advertising, if not
under section 2(c) (1) then under section 17 of the 1947 Act, or under title
II, without regard to the 1947 Act. But no evidence has been found that
Congress coordinated the available evidence on emergency purchases with its
consideration of title II extension, and the fact that the Defense Department
may have ostensibly relied on the 1947 Act in its procurement without adver-
tised, competitive bids would seem to offer no excuse for the committee.
In its deliberations on negotiated procurement, at approximately the same
period in which the Small Business Committee reports were being issued, the
House Armed Services Committee concentrated on the appropriate action to
be taken with respect to reducing the volume of awards made pursuant to
section 2(c) (1) (the national emergency provision) of the Armed Services
Procurement Act of 1947. The committee expresses shock at what it describes
as the Air Force's almost cynical flouting of the declared purpose of the 1947
Act 6 but fails to show why such a description should be applied to any de-
partment, such as the Air Force, which is authorized to act under title II of
the First War Powers Act. The committee's conclusion that the use of nego-
tiation "is to be the exception rather than the rule" 70 also does not appear
to be an accurate description of the situation. It is not an exception under
title II as implemented by Executive Order No. 10210, and no significant ex-
ception under the 1947 Act if negotiation is "otherwise authorized by law"
as it is under title II. Therefore, there would appear to be no basis for con-
cluding that a department, authorized to act under Executive Order 10210,
is on notice under the 1947 Act that Congress desires that procurement by
negotiation be used only in exceptional circumstances.7 The emergency dec-
laration of December 1950 remains in existence and Executive Order 10210,
68 S. REP. No. 1368, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1956). Also, see S. REP. No. 46, 85th Cong.
1st Sess., with respect to a case where purchasing officials arbitrarily limited the number of potential
suppliers to but two companies and "grossly exaggerated" the so-called emergency nature of the pro-
curement as a reason for not inviting competitive bids from small suppliers.
69 Supra note 20, at 5038.
70 ld. at 5039.
71 Id. at 5077, 5081.
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which contains a presidential determination that procurement without adver-
tising and competition will facilitate the national defense, also is relied upon
as in existence. What department head would want to take the responsibility
for substituting advertising and competition for negotiation without competi-
tion in any case where there was any doubt as to the risk to the defense effort?
The Armed Services hearing showed that the greatest concern of the
committee was the failure of the defense agencies to secure competition for
procurement awards and while the committee was reminded that title II per-
mits negotiation, it did not appear to realize that title II is the only actual
authority for negotiation without competition regardless of the fact that the
Defense Department indicated that it had been relying upon 2(c) (1) of the
1947 Act as authority for practically all of its negotiated procurement. The
committee seemed to take it for granted that even though 2(c) (1) does not,
whereas title II does, include a waiver of competition as well as advertising,
the 1947 Act authorized negotiation without competition. Yet a prepared
statement of the Defense Department acknowledged that procurement by
negotiation under 2(c) (1) "does not remove the requirement in competition
in the award of contracts." 72 That statement is a recognition of the obvious
fact that the negotiation authorized by section 2(c) (1) of the 1947 Act is a
waiver of the advertising requirement only and that it does not include a
waiver of the competition requirement. Any reminder of that fact, after it
apparently has been overlooked for approximately seven years, seems cer-
tain to meet with considerable resistance, if not hostility, on the part of the
legislative as well as the executive branch of the Government. Any suggestion
of limitations in 2(c) (1), at this late date, quite possibly will result in at-
tempts to minimize the merits of the suggestion on the theory that it was the
intent of Congress, in enacting the 1947 procurement legislation, to provide
for a waiver of competition as well as advertising in section 2(c) (1), as spe-
cifically covered in the War Powers Act and the implementing executive order,
even though advertising only is mentioned in the 1947 Act. Such an inten-
tion is not clear from the legislative history of that Act and the Defense De-
partment's statement " is in conflict with any theory that the legislative history
establishes that intention.
The treatment which may be given to any suggestion that questions the
merits of the prior preoccupation of the executive and legislative branches of
the Government with 2(c) (1) may be indicated in the very short discussion
at the hearing with respect to the significance of section 2(c) (17). The effect
of the remarks of one committee member "' was to suggest that even if Con-
72 Id. at 5100.
7.1 Ibid.
74 Id. at 5085.
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gress should adopt the committee chairman's bill to limit the use of 2(c) (1),
it would be ineffective-so long as the War Powers Act is operative-unless
2(c) (17) were eliminated. Those few remarks are extremely significant to
establish the inadequacy of any limitation upon the use of 2(c) (1) and there-
fore of equal significance to show that the committee was pursuing a mere
shadow in its concentration upon 2 (c) (1). However, the committee member
who made the remarks did not press his point and accepted a reply to his
question, which was not responsive to the real issue he raised. Thereupon,
the committee proceeded with its consideration of 2(c) (1) as if no vital ques-
tion had been raised as to the merits of the proposed legislation and of the
matters being considered in that connection.
In the absence of any evidence to support the apparent interpretation
of section 2(c) (1) by the Armed Services Committee, it would seem obvious
that the Judiciary Committees of Congress should also have a good look at
the Defense Department's use of negotiation in procurement, whenever those
committees are considering an extension of the First War Powers Act. Since
the Defense Department's statement "' actually recognizes that none of the
other sections, in addition to section 2(c) (1), of the 1947 Act waives compe-
tition, it necessarily follows that notwithstanding the fact that it cites 2 (c) (1)
as its authority the Department in effect admitted that its only authority to
negotiate without competition is title II of the War Powers Act as imple-
mented by appropriate executive order. The Department seems to have at-
tempted in its early testimony to show that all of its negotiated procurement
actually was based upon competition. In that attempt, however, it uses equi-
vocal language " to the extent that the testimony lacked conviction. That
fact seems to explain the committee chairman's remarks as follows:
"You have a limited competitive bidding. It is limited to the extent that
you have negotiated on a competitive basis with a certain group. But the
whole field of industry may not have had an opportunity to submit a negotiated
bid because the trade or people may not have known anything about it.
"You do have competitive bidding when you are negotiating. But the
weakness of that lies in the fact-two weaknesses: One, you have no standard
to go by and the other is that it is so limited in its field." 77
That failure to provide standards is open to the same objections as those men-
tioned in the beginning of this article-with respect to the lack of standards
in the exercise of the war power to amend contracts without consideration.
It is not government by law.
75 Id. at 510o.
76 Ibid.
77 Id, at 5119; also see 5197-5199, inc.
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Despite the committee chairman's declaration of his conviction that the
Defense Department has competition of a type in all of its negotiated pro-
curement, the Department's own testimony tends to refute that declaration.
The Department read into the record a portion of the Hoover Report on Mili-
tary Procurement " which stated in part that:
"In negotiated purchasing, fair and reasonable prices to the military de-
partments are insured through skillful negotiation and sound cost analysis and
repricing techniques. They are further insured when competition is present."
The last statement would appear to indicate that competition is not always
present in the Department's negotiations. At least one other indication of
that fact appears in the testimony.7" The Department appeared adamant at
the regret expressed by one committee member that it justified to a great ex-
tent its procedure for obviating the intendment of the statute, on the report
of the Hoover Commission.
Actually, there is some indication that when the provisions of the 1947
act were being drafted, it was understood that section 2(c) (1) would not
be used because title II was still in effect and contracts could be negotiated
without 2(c) (1).80 But a committee member stated it as his impression that
the Department of Defense would agree with the Committee that hencefor-
ward they will not enter into negotiated contracts pursuant to title II.81 While
another committee member suggested that in view of the Defense Depart-
ment's amenability to such an agreement, the bill under consideration by the
committee be amended to prohibit negotiated military procurement under title
11,82 the Chairman seemed inclined to prefer to let the informal understand-
ing with the department suffice.8"
No one at the hearing explained to the Chairman that such an informal
understanding appeared superficial as to any contracts negotiated without
competition, since regardless of any ostensible reliance on section 2(c) (1)
for such contracts, title II is the only actual authority to justify negotiated
procurement without competition. It may be too obvious for comment that
the Chairman as well as the Defense Department actually may have realized
the importance of title II as a basic authority and, for that reason, did not wish
to prohibit its use in negotiated procurement. In any event, it would seem
clear that such use should be, and should have been, associated with the an-
nual considerations of title II extension. The record of the annual considera-
78 Id. at 5114-5115.
79 Id. at 5086, 5238.
80 Id. at 5083.
81 Id. at 5238.
82 Ibid.
8, Id. at 5239.
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tions of title II also fail to show a recognition that title II actually is the only
authority for administrative implementation of Defense Manpower Policy No.
4.84 The stated purpose of Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 is to provide for
procurement by negotiated contracts and purchases with responsible concerns
which are in an area of current or imminent labor surplus (including a sur-
plus of manpower possessing skills necessary to the fulfillment of Government
contracts and purchases), in cases where the public interest dictates the need
for doing so in order to achieve certain objectives."5 Since there is nothing
in the law, 6 referred to at the time that policy was declared, to show any
legal authority to negotiate a contract where it is administratively determined
that there is unemployment that should be relieved, some in Congress appar-
ently have accepted the theory that section 2(c) (1) is sufficient authority.87
However, as heretofore indicated, it seems clear that section 2(c) (1) is no
authority for negotiation under those circumstances unless it is pursued with
a sufficiently representative number of firms to give the Government the bene-
fits of competition in the procurement. If such competition is not attained,
the procurement has no validity 88 unless it was deemed necessary to facilitate
the national defense so as to bring it within title I'89 Aside from the fact
that such method of procurement precludes business as well as Government
from receiving the benefit of a traditionally competitive economy, it more
seriously compromises the traditional concept of Government by law, by sub-
jecting the best interests of both business and the Government to the whims
and caprices of a bureaucracy more than ever exposed to pressure groups.
THE ADMINISTRATION OF PROGRESS PAYMENTS
Progress payments are payments made as work progresses, in advance of
delivery, upon the basis of costs incurred or of percentage of performance
accomplished or of a particular stage of completion. They involve risks
84 17 FED. REG. 1195 (1952); 1 CCH GOV'T. CONTRACTS REP. parag. 2261 (1952).
85 (a) To coordinate conversion from the civilian to military production.
(b) To minimize strains and dislocations in the economy resulting from such conversion.
(c) To preserve employee skills necessary to the fulfillment of Government contracts and
purchases.
(d) To maintain productive facilities.
(e) To assure utilization of the nation's total manpower potential by making use of the
manpower resources of each area.
(f) To help assure timely delivery of required goods and services by locating procurement
where the needed manpower facilities are fully available.
86 Executive Order No. 10193, dated December 16, 1950, 15 FED. REG. 9031, issued "By virtue
of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including the Defense Production
Act of 1950 [64 STAT. 798, 50 App., U.S.C. 2061]."
87 99 CONG. REC. 3245-3248 (1953).
88 To the extent that it would not be a proper charge against public funds since the Government
would not have the advantage of competitive bidding.
89 The proponents have never presented a very persuasive showing as to the validity of the
authority relied upon in issuing it. See note 87 supra at 3246.
90 Joint Regulation of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, Issued March
17, 1952, parag. 106, 1 CCH Gov'T. CONTRACTS REP. parag. 23,010 (1952).
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of monetary loss comparable to the risks of loss on guaranteed loans, with-
out the advantage of sharing the risks with private financing institutions.
They also are more expensive for the Government to administer because they
require considerably more audit and inspection work. Unless the Govern-
ment has title or a superior lien in goods not delivered,"' public monies nor-
mally may not be used to pay for goods not delivered. " As late as 1952,
the regulations of the Defense Department "' promulgated for use in de-
fense contract financing, including progress payments, failed to show, with
any definiteness, the methods used to determine whether a contractor should
receive progress payments. Approximately two years later the regulations
still were not well defined. A directive 0, was issued in the early part of 1954
as a guide for use until "the issuance of contemplated comprehensive regu-
lations governing all progress payments." It was stated at a Senate Small
Business Committee hearing two months later 11 that the directive of February
12, 1954, "deals with, among other things, the erroneous rumors that progress
payments had been stopped within the Department of Defense." The Feb-
ruary directive was cancelled two weeks after the hearing by another direc-
tive.96  That directive, issued "to clarify certain questions that have arisen,"
contained nothing about the order of preference with respect to the type of
financing to be used whereas the February directive had made progress pay-
ments supplementary to private financing, including guaranteed loans.
The same April hearing disclosed some concern by certain businessmen
because of a letter of December 21, 1953,"7 from Brigadier General James S.
Willis, Commanding Officer, Signal Corps Supply Agency, Philadelphia, Penn-
sylvania, addressed to contractors working out of that office and advising
them that the authority of contracting officers to grant progress payments had
been withdrawn for the purpose of minimizing certain financial risks inci-
dent to progress payments as one of a number of actions being taken to de-
crease the expenditures of public funds and keep within the national debt
limitation of $275 billion. In the future, awards of contracts to the maximum
extent possible would be limited to those who possessed adequate resources
to finance performance with their own funds or with those procured without
Government assistance. He also stated that while the agency did not intend
"by immediate overt action" to stop progress payments as provided for in
some of its contracts, it was incumbent upon all contractors concerned to take
1 28 CoMP. GEN. 468 (1949); 20 COMP. GEN. 917,918 (1941).
92 Revised Statutes, sect. 3648, 60 STAT. 809, 31 U.S.C. 529 (1952).
9a Supra note 90 at CCH parag. 23,000-23,089, inc.
94 Department of Defense Directive No. 7840.1, February 15, 1954.
95 Supra note 16 at 325-341.
96 Department of Defense Directive No. 7840.1, April 22, 1954, 1 CCH Gov'T. CONTRACTS
REP. parag. 8017 (1952).




prompt steps to reduce or liquidate their need for that type of Government
financing at the earliest practicable date. The Contract Finance Committee
chairman testified at the April 1954 ' hearing that the letter turned up in
the form of a complaint several places quite quickly; that he took it up with
the Army; and that two internal Army papers were issued as well as an addi-
tional letter " from General Willis, in pertinent part, as follows:
"My letter of December 21, 1953, was intended to advise you of the gen-
eral guidelines to be employed in the administration of progress payments
and I believe it would be helpful at this time to elaborate upon the state-
ments contained therein. It is fully recognized that progress payments are
sometimes necessary and useful to supplement the working funds available to
defense contractors of all sizes. Like other forms of contract financing, they
are regarded as a tool that may be used to the benefit of the Government to
support contract performance. When and to the extent reasonably necessary,
they are considered useful on contracts involving a long lead time or prepara-
tory period requiring pre-delivery expenditures that are large in relation to
the amount of the contract and to the contractor's working capital and credit.
When found necessary and appropriate, after full consideration has been given
to utilization of private financing and guaranteed loans, the requirement for
progress payments is justified in the awarding of a contract if there will be
a benefit to the Government in dealing with the particular contractor deemed
competent and capable of contract performance.
"It should be noted that progress payments, as provided in existing or in
new contracts, may be made to replenish working capital funds for the con-
tractor on a minimum basis commensurate with the contractor's actual current
production schedule requirements from time to time and the minimum inven-
tory lead time for future production under schedule requirements."
The Willis letter of December 21, 1953, was reported to account in part
for a memorandum of January 12, 1954,10 one of the two internal Army
papers referred to by the finance committee chairman at the April hearing.
That memorandum referred to recent articles in the press and in trade pub-
lications as indicating that some segments of industry apparently were mis-
interpreting the policy established in September, 1953,1°1 to control progress
payment financing and stated that it appeared appropriate to restate that policy
to make certain that Department of the Army personnel responsible for the
administration of progress payments would act in a manner consistent with the
spirit of it.
The other Army paper referred to by the finance committee chairman
was Disposition Form G.4/EI-2498 102 which refers to five other disposition
98 Id. at 331-332.
o9 Id. at 332.
100 Id. at 476.
101 Id. at 480.
102 Id. at 476-477.
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forms on defense contract financing. That paper directed that careful analysis
be made of the contractor's financial condition, working capital needs, and
credit resources for his entire operation projected over the terms of the con-
tract (in relation to the performance schedule and the contractor's minimum
requirements for materials), and that progress payments always should be
founded upon adequate compensating benefit to the Government as considera-
tion supporting the progress payment.
The standards to be used in administering progress payments are more
definitely stated in the April 1954 directive 10. than in previous directives. It
stated that progress payments require careful administration to insure against
overpayments and losses, and that in all cases physical progress of work
should be evaluated periodically to assure that progress payments are fairly
supported by the value of work actually accomplished on the undelivered por-
tion in conformity with contract requirements. The directive also provided
that the extent of supervision required, whether for loss prevention or for
avoidance of overpayments, should vary inversely with the experience, per-
formance record, reliability, quality of management, and financial strength
of contractors,"' and with the adequacy of their accounting system and con-
trols. It further provided that particular care must be taken to assure that
the unpaid balance of the contract price will be adequate to cover the antici-
pated cost of completion, or that the contractor has adequate resources to
complete the contract if the unpaid balance of the contract price is inadequate
to cover costs of production.
It seems very strange indeed that authority so long enjoyed under the
First War Powers Act had been so long without "regulations perscribed by
the President for the protection of the interests of the Government." 105 Noth-
ing would seem more obvious to demonstrate the undesirability of allowing
the discretion under the Act to be widely and variously delegated. Yet there
is nothing to show that the circumstances ever were brought to the attention
of Congress at any of the many occasions on which it had to consider the
wisdom of extending the duration of the Act.
Moreover, it would appear appropriate to be alert to the possibility that
undue prodding by small business, insofar as the best interests of the Gov-
ernment are concerned, may account for the apparent failure of the Depart-
ment of Defense to follow a consistent policy in defense contract financing,
especially as to requiring that the progress payments be supplementary to
103 See note 96 supra.
104 Also, see parag. 4a, Disposition Form G4/W-56057, September 16, 1953, supra note 16 at
483.
105 64 STAT. 1257 (1951), 50 U.S.C. App. 611 (1952).
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private financing. The about-face position taken by the second Willis let-
ter ... tends to raise a question as to whether it was as fully responsive as the
first letter 107 to the best interests of the Government. Clearly, an examina-
tion of the whole testimony offered on progress payments at the 1954 hearing
of the Senate Small Business Committee definitely shows the possibility that
the Committee may have been pressing the Defense Department too hard to
make progress payments available to small contractors. The Department's
finance committee chairman described the results of the policy of the Depart-
ment as an overuse of progress payments, indicating that percentages were
a little high and that progress payments were handed out "unduly automati-
cally."
The record of unliquidated progress payments referred to in the Senate
Small Business Committee hearing April 1, 1954, on the 1954 military pro-
curement program 1oI also suggests the possibility that there may be many
more cases in which more adequate controls and more competent administra-
tion are needed. The likelihood of that possibility still persisted in similar
data for the next twelve months, as presented at the Senate Small Business
Committee hearing May 5, 1955, on the 1955 military procurement program. "
THE ADMINISTRATION OF AMENDMENTS WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
The well established rule of law that no officer or agent of the Govern-
ment may waive a vested right of the Government without adequate con-
sideration 110 was greatly modified by the First War Powers Act which per-
mitted the President to authorize certain agencies and departments to modify
contracts without regard to the provisions of the relevant law. That portion
of the Act was in derogation of existing substantive law."1  Or as one con-
gressman described it the Act upset the entire law of contracts.1"
While Executive Orders Nos. 9001 and 10210 authorized several agen-
cies and departments to perform under the Act, consideration will be limited
to the Department of Defense since that Department is most prominently
identified with the Act. Chapter IV of the Joint Regulations of the Armed
Forces, issued February 21, 1951,1' Part 438.2, provides that any action taken
100 Supra note 16 at 332.
107a Id. at 333.
107b A recent directive by the Department of Defense, No. 7800.4, November 16, 1956, tends
to indicate a bow to more pressure to liberalize still further the granting of progress payments.
108 Id. at 330-331, including a breakdown of the 881 contractors-exclusive of those engaged
in construction work-which had progress payments in amounts outstanding under $1 million each.
109 See note 2 supra.
110 American Sales Co. v. United States, 32 F. 2d 141, 142 (1929) and cases cited; 5 C.G. 605
(1926); 14 C.G. 468 (1934).
111 1 CCH GOV'T. CONTRACTS REP. parag. 21,755 (30-404 e. (2) (1952).
112 See note 7 supra.
I's 2 CCH GOV'T. CONTRACTS REP., parag. 24,806.
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under the Act and the Executive Order must be based on a finding that the
national defense will be facilitated thereby. That finding is stated to be a
matter of sound judgment to be made on the basis of all of the facts of a
given case. Examples of certain, but not all, cases or types of cases where
relief may appropriately be granted are shown, but the regulations point out
that enumeration of the examples is not intended to exclude other cases where
the circumstances are such as to warrant the granting of relief, and that even
in the enumerated cases other factors may result in a denial of relief. The
first example or case enumerated is as follows:
"a. Amendments without consideration.
(1) Where an actual or threatened loss on a defense contract, however
caused, will impair the productive ability of a contractor whose continued
operation as a source of supply is found to be essential to the national de-
fense, the contract will generally be equitably adjusted to the extent necessary
to avoid such impairment of the contractor's productive ability."
Where actual or threatened loss will impair the productive ability of a
contractor, the regulations appear to infer that loss of such productive ability
would materially damage the efficacy of the defense effort by reason of an
insufficient number of other similarly responsible sources of supply and that,
therefore, continued operation as a source of supply is essential to the national
defense. In such circumstances, it is not difficult to understand how relief
to the contractor in the form of an amendment without consideration might
facilitate the national defense. Where other sources of supply are available,
an Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Army has testified that the Army
cannot very well find "that that man is absolutely essential to the national de-
fense" and that according to standards prescribed by Defense Department
regulations, the adjustment boards are powerless to grant relief because they
cannot so relate his production to needs as to justify the expenditure."' How-
ever, that official left no doubt about the actual ineffectiveness of the regula-
tions in his later testimony at the same hearing when he said:
"I have taken the attitude that the standard is set out before they start
giving any examples, and it is a matter of sound judgment on all the circum-
stances.
"I have tried to indicate to the committee the factors that went into the
exercise of the sound judgment. I tried to tell the Moody committee that,
although I gave lip service to the word 'essentiality'. If they will examine
the findings of my board, after the first few cases, they will find in most in-
stances that we steer clear of the bugaboo 'essentiality'. We spell out the cir-
cumstances surrounding the nature of the article, the uniqueness of the article,
the purpose for which the article is being produced, who is producing it, how
many other people produce it or can produce it, what is the price, what would
1 1
4 Supra note 7 at 10.
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be the delay if we defaulted and went somewhere else. And all the circum-
stances, whether it is good business judgment, to continue to procure the article
or to go somewhere else.
"I do not know how to get away from all the argument about essential-
ity. Early in the proceeding someone wanted to get together and define 'essen-
tiality'. I object to anybody trying to define 'essentiality', because the minute
we try to define it, we will find that there is some case that falls on the ambits
of it or on the outside of it.
I still think that good business judgment on all the circumstances as to
whether the procurement is vitally important is a common sense judgment to
go by and that we should not tinker with the definition."
That statement appears to make it crystal clear that amendments without con-
sideration were being granted, and there is no available public record to show
that such amendments still are not being granted entirely on the basis of an
exceedingly broad discretion exercised by the contract adjustment boards con-
trary to the regulations of its own Departments, and the executive order and
the act under which the regulations were issued.
It appears clear from other testimony at the hearing involved that the
chairman of the hearing committee also construed the essentiality test to re-
quire a determination that the petitioning contractor be an indispensable
source of supply.115 Also, certain administrative procedures in the Joint Regu-
lations provide that in forwarding the contractor's application, the contracting
officer shall show, among other facts, (1) the importance of the contract or
the contractor to the furtherance of the national defense effort, indicating
present or future need for the action, (2) other available sources of supply
in comparison with the contractor, and (3) a statement of opinion as to
whether the granting of relief will facilitate the national defense effort.11"
But despite the testimony showing that the actual practice of the board is to
ignore the essentiality test "in most instances", expressions of concern over
essentiality as the test have been made by those, in the other instances, who
have been denied relief by the boards. They have tried to convince Congress
that such a test is too restrictive because it denies relief to a contractor who
has suffered loss on a Government contract due to factors not reasonably to
be anticipated and far beyond his control. In such a case, it has been argued
that the test for relief should be whether the contractor has acted competently
and in good faith but nevertheless has suffered substantial loss due to no fault
on his part. 17 Language to that effect was proposed by eleven members of
115 Supra note 7 at 18 and 31.
116 1 CCH Gov'T. CONTRACTS REP. parag. 21,752 and 21,757 (30-406.2 b. (4) (d) (h) (n);
30-406.3 c.4, 9, 14) (1952).
117 Supra note 7 at 46; Small Defense Plants Administration Analysis of S. 1175, a Bill to
Amend and Extend, until June 30, 1954, the Provisions of title II of the First War Powers Act as
Amended, and to Prescribe Standards for its Administration 8 (1953).
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Congress in a bill 118 submitted as an amendment and extension of title II of
the First War Powers Act. The bill failed to become law and the adminis-
trative regulations remained unchanged. However, in May, 1953, the coun-
sel for the Army Contract Adjustment Board, the control board in the De-
partment of the Army administering amendments under the act, testified be-
fore the House Judiciary Committee that the Board approves amendments
without consideration-
"because there are no other suppliers, or because other suppliers could not pro-
duce in timely fashion, or for any other number of similar reasons we find
that the particular contractor is essential and that the amendment will facilitate
the national defense." 119
That statement of policy would seem to indicate that while the pertinent regu-
lations remain unchanged in limiting the test of essentiality to the contractor's
indispensability as a source of supply, the boards ignore the regulations, merely
pay lip service to them at most, and use "any other number of similar" tests.
If board counsel accurately reported the procedure as to the criteria or tests
used, it would appear that the boards are exercising a discretion in the matter
far broader than they are authorized to exercise under the administrative regu-
lation, and much too broad to protect the interests of the Government, as
required by Executive Order 10210 and the First War Powers Act. Such pro-
cedure on the part of the board appears to reduce section 438.2a.(1) of the
Joint Regulations to a mere subterfuge and further appears to be an unau-
thorized conciliatory gesture to those who approximately a year prior to the
board counsel's testimony, argued against the essentiality test-even in the
apparently few instances in which it was used-especially where it involves
financial ruin for small-business contractors suffering from excessive loss on
Government contracts due to abnormal risks beyond their control. 2 ' In other
words, on the surface of things, the regulations remain unchanged because
of the failure of the legislation designed to prohibit the essentiality test, but
in actual administrative practice, to reduce the pressure of criticism, the Boards
appear to be using so many situations to establish essentiality that it has no
genuine significance as a test. The result appears to be that the real test has
become the subjective one sought in the unaccomplished legislation rather
than the objective one of the Government's interest in facilitating the national
defense. Under the subjective test, if the contractor has acted competently
and in good faith and nevertheless has suffered 121 substantial loss due to no
118 S. 1175, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953).
119 Stenographic Transcript of Proceedings before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcom-
mittee No. 2, on H. R. 2557, to amend the Act of January 12, 1951, as amended, to Continue in
effect the Provisions of title II of the First War Powers Act, 1941, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1953).
110 Supra note 7 at 49.
121 See note 117 supra.
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fault on his part, the proponents of that test argue that title II was intended
to give the contractor relief, irrespective of the fact that such relief is not
necessary to facilitate the national defense.
Such action on the part of the boards subjects the Government's best in-
terests and therefore the individual taxpayer to a type of tyranny just as ob-
jectionable as that feared by Justice Douglas in his dissent in the case of
United States v. Wunderlich.122 It leaves the matter of granting amendments
without consideration dependent upon so many indefinite and intangible fac-
tors as to subject both the contractor and the Government to the whim and
caprice of an official or bureaucrat who may be just as stubborn, incompe-
tent or negligent as the tyrant described by Justice Douglas. One need not
attempt to imagine the possibilities with the board's operating on the basis
of a broad discretion rather than definite standards. The evil is in the testi-
mony which discloses the boards' methods. For example, in other testimony
of the Assistant Judge Advocate General he refers to the test of "whether
the procurement is vitally important" whereas shortly before that statement,
he stated that if a small business man "is producing anything that can be
spelled out as important for the defense effort, and he gets caught in the steel
jam and he comes for relief, I have an idea that the great majority of them
will get it." 123 Thus, mere importance to the defense effort is first described
as sufficient whereas almost simultaneously vital importance (essentiality) is
stated to be necessary. It will be noted that vital importance (essentiality)
was referred to by the witness as the standard in concluding a statement in
which the witness made it clear that the board paid only lip service to essen-
tiality, but actually made its determinations upon the basis of many factors
in addition to "how many other people produce it or can produce it."
It seems very unfortunate that hearings where such vulnerable testimony
is offered do not include one or more individuals who are free to represent
the best interests of the Government in such a manner as to compel a recon-
ciliation of such testimony with the legislation and executive order involved,
to insist upon an opportunity to examine the files of the cases as they are
decided by the boards and to place in the record, in such a way as to focus
wide public attention, all of the cases involving the allowance of amendments
not necessary to facilitate the national defense. Such representation in the
public interest should also be in a position to insist that the Congress be fur-
nished presidential appraisal of the boards' action in those cases so that Con-
gress would have definite, authoritative information from the individual in
whom complete discretion and primary responsibility was placed by Congress.
122 See note 1 supra.
123 Supra note 7 at 60.
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What little representation the Government's best interests received may be
found in the remarks made by one Congressman that all that was really sought
to be accomplished in the legislation was to bail out a few poor businessmen
who were unwise enough to bid on a Government contract without covering
themselves with the necessary supplies to furnish the Government with the
material. " Or the statement by another Congressman that he was sick and
tired of hearing a contractor talk private enterprise and then want the Gov-
ernment to underwrite him. Whatever the merits of those remarks, it would
seem clear that it is as important for the Government to have a reputation
for forthright administration of unprecedented power grants as it is that it
will not "let people down on the basis of equity and practical justice." 12'
Therefore, it would appear obvious that well before an attempt is made to
seek another extension of title II of the First War Powers Act, there be pre-
pared for the President's consideration and referral to Congress a compre-
hensive outline of each case for the last three years in which amendments
without consideration have been allowed by the Defense Department's Con-
tract Adjustments Boards, showing clearly for each one how the facts involved
justified a determination that each amendment was necessary to facilitate the
national defense. Any other type of report, which might merely state that a
spot check had been made of so many cases before the board and only a cer-
tain number found of questionable merit, would be far short of conclusive.
Only unless such a report showed in considerable detail the standards used,
in each case examined, to justify an amendment, would such a report furnish
the means necessary to evaluate the report itself. It is manifest from the testi-
mony of those who are responsible for the issuance of amendments without
consideration that the facts relied upon actually do not establish in many in-
stances that the approval of an amendment without consideration is necessary
to facilitate the national defense.
12
124 Supra note 27 at 9.
125 Id. at 18.
126 That fact lends special emphasis to the question of adequacy in the administration of title H1.
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